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Abstract 
This research combines static and behavior analysis to detect malwares on Android 
system. The analysis process was completed by implementing analysis process on a malware-
infected application running on an Android device. The analysis process was implemented based 
on specific stages, started from implementing behavior analysis on a malware-infected application 
running on Android device. Moreover, this behavior analysis ran the application on an Android 
emulator; afterwards, the file processing running on Android would be analyzed using the tool 
designed on this research to determine whether or not the executed application has been infected 
by malware. By utilizing behavior analysis, this research aimed to construct LiME kernel module 
being able to be executed on Android to collect data running on Android memory. This collected 
data would be analyzed further using volatility as data scanning. The second analysis utilized 
static analysis by checking the application on android system before running. During the static 
analysis, the application extraction was executed to generate some files to be analyzed to verify 
malware infection.  
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1. Introduction 
Malware, short from Malicious Software, is as hostile or intrusive software, intentionally 
developed to be embedded in a computer system to steal information data and even destroy a 
computer system [1]. 
An Android system is a Linux-based operation system having open access operation 
system. Android system has some superiority from having open source operation system, 
enabling multitasking, providing simple notification to great number of existing application and 
software running on this system. Therefore, these advantages provided on open source Android 
system, at the same time, can also bring some drawbacks by allowing open platform to all 
developers (users) to design and develop their own applications running on cellular devices. 
Hence, it eases software developers to develop malwares as applications to intrude Android 
system [2]. 
There are some malware analysis techniques, some of which are malware static analysis 
and malware behavior analysis. Malware static analysis is a malware analysis by checking 
applications suspected as malicious, without executing the file. On the other hand, malware 
behavior analysis is direct analysis by running and analyzing file system, memory, process, 
network traffic, and other modifications after executing the malware [3].  
Memory is divided into two types, namely non-volatile and volatile memory. The analysis 
processed on non-volatile memory can be implemented to a memory retaining its data when the 
system is not running, exemplified by a hard disc, flash disc, and SD/micro SD/mini SD. However, 
the analysis process on volatile memory is implemented on memory such as RAM. Furthermore, 
on non-volatile memory analysis, there are some possible risks related to its integrity when 
implementing careless analysis processing. The analysis on volatile memory greatly reduce those 
risks because the researcher had made memory duplication containing all data in the system 
such as process, registry, files and system or specific applications in the system. Due to its 
function as a bridge between hard disc and processor, RAM, therefore, records all previous 
processes running in the system minimizing the potential risks. Even though the system itself is 
inactive, the analysis process is still able to run from duplicated RAM [4]. 
Android system operation, having big popularity in the world, has become the main target 
from malware developers. Android not designed to provide maximum security becomes the 
ISSN: 2503-2259; E-ISSN: 2503-2267 
KINETIK Vol. 3, No. 1, February 2018: 81-90 
 
 
                    
 
82 
following reason. Initially, old version of Android showed significant security vulnerability; 
however, the following Android types exhibit adequate security level. This research employed 
new Android version, Lollipop, having better security level. A question needed to be answered is 
whether the types of attack and malware characteristics will exactly identical in different Android 
version. Thus, in responding to this question, the research performed analysis process on Uapush 
malware reported the biggest infection in 2016 for comparing between KitKat and Lollipop Android 
version. 
Uapush.a is a malware included in adware Trojan Android having high level of threat, 
sending Short Message Service (SMS) messages, and stealing private information such as IMSI, 
IMEI, important information from a device, bookmarks and call history sent to C&C server in 
China. This type of malware is based on C&C located in China [5]. 
 
2. Research Method 
Testing was performed to test the superiority of Lollipop and KitKat. Furthermore, this 
testing was conducted to answer the existing problems often found in different version of Android 
system operation related to malware infection; hence, compatibility testing was conducted, static 
and behavior analysis.  
The testing itself had been designed to recognize the malware characteristics of Uapush 
on Android. The research ran using an Android emulator having similar functions to the original 
system. There were two methods combined to achieve more complete results. The first method 
employed was behavior analysis being an Android analysis technique running an application 
presumably infected by malware in the emulator; afterwards, the static analysis will be conducted 
by reading the application’s source code presumably infected by malware [6]. 
Before installation, implementation and testing process were implemented, the system 
design and topology were developed. This system design would simplify the implementation and 
testing processes in analyzing Uapush-type malware. The following Figure 1 illustrates the system 
design. 
 
2.1 General System Design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. General System Design 
 
Based on Figure 1, the research utilized victim smartphones, with rooted process and 
without rooted process. In order to simplify the architecture, it employed system operations in the 
form of virtual machine installed by those system operations. The input of this research is an 
Android application presumably infected with Uapush-type malware. Moreover, two analysis 
methods were employed using static and behavior analysis, commonly used in malware analysis 
processing. Static analysis performed in this research was conducted by decompressing the APK 
file and analyzing the result. Meanwhile, behavior analysis was started by running or executing 
the APK file into a device following by RAM cloning [7]. 
 
Results Analysis Process 
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APK File 
RAM Cloning 
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2.2 Architecture of Dynamic Analysis 
Based on previously presented Figure 2, the researcher developed virtual machines in 
window host, each of them installed with rooted and non-rooted Android. Each virtual machine 
was infected by Uapush-type malware resulting into 2 virtual machines. Subsequently, the 
analysis process of live response on each virtual machine infected by malware was conducted 
[8]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Figure 2. Architecture of Behavior Analysis 
 
2.3 Architecture of Static Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Architecture of Dynamic Analysis 
 
Figure 3 represents architecture design for analysis process in the windows host using 
Windows 8.1 Pro. Dex2jar and JD-GUI had been installed in Windows system used to analyze 
the application infected by Uapush-type of malware. 
 
3. Research Result and Discussion 
3.1 Dynamic Analysis 
On this testing, a kernel module was created, and the results from compile LiME were 
stored into the devices. The following command was used to run kernel module [9]. 
$adb push lime-goldfish.ko /sdcard/lime.ko 
$adb forward tcp:4444 tcp:4444 
$adb shell insmod /sdcard/lime.ko “path=tcp:4444 format=lime” & 
After running decompile LiME in the devices, the file would be accessed by suing Netcat to 
obtain capture results from the device RAM to be processed further in the analysis. The following 
command was used to access the file using Netcat: 
$nc localhost 4444 > lime.lime 
The previous command used was LiME TCP transfer to obtain the results of device RAM 
capture; consecutively, the scanning process was conducted for the results of RAM capture using 
volatile. Image RAM analysis was conducted to determine the characteristics from the calculator 
application infected by Uapush-type malware having characteristics of command and control 
server and investigated malicious commands to steal IMEI and IMSI. Furthermore, observing 
open file and running process executed by a malware infected application became two processes 
conducted in this research. The analysis results are presented in the following section.  
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3.1.1 Network Analysis 
Analyzing process in network is necessary because several types of malware do 
communication through network. Such communication will be restored in RAM. Therefore, 
comprehensive study to analyze operating system and reverse engineering is required, volatile 
memory can be the substitute to analyze this case. 
There were two plugins used, linux_route_cache plugin employed to observe network route 
running in the device and linux_arp plugin to observe default gateway. Table 1 presents the results 
of these examinations [10]. 
 
Table 1. Network Analysis of Uapush Image RAM in KitKat 
Network Analysis 
Interface  Eth0 
Destination 117.135.141.99 
Gateway 10.0.2.2 
 
From the results obtained from the route cache running in the device, it was observed that 
IP 117.135.141.99 conducted network route configuration in the device using gateway 10.0.2.2 
allowing IP 117.135.141.99 to communicate with external parties. After it was checked using 
Whois, the results are as Figure 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Whois C&C Server Malware 
 
Who is informed C&C Server of Uapush-type malware was located on 200 Changhou 
Road, Shanghai, China. 
 
3.1.2 IMEI and IMSI Analysis 
Linux_yarascan plugin was used to identify and obtained the proof that the application had 
been infected by Uapush malware having previously installed in the device. The results are 
presented by Table 2. 
From the previous results, the calculator application after being installed altered its name 
to kfines.RealCalc using a process running on PID 1323 having sub-process address of 
0xb3f4b854 and 0xb3f4b803. It contained commands to acquire some device information such 
as IMEI and IMSI. 
 
Table 2. Analysis of Data Stealing of Uapush Image RAM in KitKat 
Analysis of Data Stealing 
Task kfines.RealCalc 
PID 1311 
Rule R1 
Addr 0xb3f4b854, 0xb3f4b803 
 
3.1.3 Open File Analysis 
In order to identify the process to opening files in the infected application, the researcher 
utilized linux_lsof plugin. The results are presented by Table 3. 
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Table 3.  Open File Analysis of Uapush Image RAM in KitKat 
Open Files 
Process 29 open file processes 
PID 1311 
Address 0xd802f400 
 
As informed by the results, the calculator application had completed 29 open file processes 
with PID process 1311 having address on 0xd802f400. Afterwards, the following analysis process 
on every open file process executed by the application can be implemented in order to identify 
each activity from every open file process conducted by the application infected malware. 
 
Table 4. Analysis of Uapush Image RAM in Lollipop 
File Description 
File Name lime.lime 
File Size 796,9 MB 
Md5hash ca7debc3782bfa5893c7c2ca1148a4ac 
   
From the result showed in Table 4, RAM Uapush run on Android Lolipop with size of 796.9 
MB and named as lime.lime was aimed to perform offline analysis, in order to prevent data 
alteration from Uapush-infected file through network. Therefore, Md5hash could help to prevent 
significant change from backed-up RAM image. 
 
3.1.4 Network Analysis 
Linux_route_cache plugin was used to examine the network gateway running on the 
device, and linux_arp plugin was used to identify its default gateway. The results are presented 
by Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Network Analysis of Uapush Image RAM in Lollipop 
Network Analysis 
Interface  Eth0 
Destination 117.135.141.99 
Gateway 10.0.2.2 
 
From the results, it was identified from the existing route cache in the device that IP 
117.135.141.99 conducted network route configuration in the device using gateway 10.0.2.2 as 
the gateway from device default to give access to IP 117.135.141.99 to communicate and to 
collect data from the infected device. The results after checked using Whois are as Figure 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Whois C&C Server Malware 
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Who is informed that the C&C Server of Uapush-type malware was located on 200 
Changhou Road, Shanghai, China. 
 
3.1.5 IMEI and IMSI Analysis 
Linux_yarascan plugin was used to identify and acquire proof that the application infected 
by Uapush malware installed in the device. The results are presented by the following Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Analysis of Data Stealing of Uapush Image RAM in KitKat 
Data Stealing Analysis 
Task kfines.RealCalc 
PID 1323 
Rule R1 
Addr 0xb3f4b854, 0xb3f4b803 
 
From the previous results, the calculator application after being installed altered its name 
to kfines.RealCalc using a process running on PID 1323 having sub-process address of 
0xb3f4b854 and 0xb3f4b803. It contained commands to acquire some device information such 
as IMEI and IMSI. 
 
3.1.6 Open File Analysis 
In order to identify the process to opening files in the infected application, the researcher 
utilized linux_lsof plugin. The results are presented by Table 7. 
 
Table 7.  Open File Analysis of Uapush Image RAM in KitKat 
Open Files 
Process 27 open file processes 
PID 1323 
Addrs 0xd802f400 
 
As informed by the results, the calculator application had completed 27 open file processes 
with PID process 1323 having address on 0xd802f400. Afterwards, the following analysis process 
on every open file process executed by the application can be implemented in order to identify 
each activity from every open file process conducted by the application infected malware. 
1. The Comparison of Uapush Characteristic between KitKat and Lollipop 
The following parameters show the comparison results on Uapush characteristics. 
2. The comparison of process executed by Uapush. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Comparison of Uapush Malicious Process 
 
Figure 6 illustrates that Uapush in KitKat has more injected code and mutexes compared 
to Lollipop. This condition is caused by more fragile security system in KitKat and imperfect 
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running of file configuration from Uapush kernel code. Having more mutexes in KitKat compared 
to Lollipop allowed unidentified running of malicious processes. 
 
3.2 Testing Static Analysis  
Static analysis becomes the second stage in malware analysis. It was started by choosing 
or finding application presumably infected with Uapush malware, the application was downloaded 
from http://www.down20.com/f-883953215. An android application detected to be infected by 
android malware would be analyzed using static analysis. The application infected by malware 
having APK extension renamed into ZIP extension. Afterwards, it was extracted by suing WinRAR 
because an APK file can be illustrated as an archive (a ZIP file) containing Dalvix Executable File 
(with DEX extension). The result of this extraction contains some files having files with DEX 
extension. Those DEX files, after that, were converted into JAR format using Dex2jar resulting a 
file with JAR extension. 
The last step was decompiling JAR file using JD-GUI in order to be compatible with all Java 
source codes examined and analyzed to detect android malware infection. This malware is 
commonly embedded in the main application’s class file or – in some cases – a specific root. 
Subsequently, the malware process in the android system would be analyzed. Finally, analyzing 
the resulting effects to the android system was conducted. 
 
3.2.1 Analysis Process 
On the previous process using dynamic analysis, the RealCalc.apk application would be 
scanned to detect malware. From the previous analysis results, the application was detected to 
be infected by malware with abnormality in some required permissions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Detail Permission on File RealCalc.apk 
 
The researcher performed analysis to RealCalc.apk application using some computer 
forensic tools. Renaming APK extension into ZIP extension was the first process conducted. 
RealCalc.zip file, as the result, was then extracted using WinRAR software generating some files 
having DEX extension. 
Utilizing Dex2jar software, those DEX files were converted in the command prompt window 
generating a JAR file. The last process was decompiling JAR file using JD-GUI to examine the 
whole Java source code in the RealCalc.apk application. Figure 7 presents class file named 
Pushservice.class, actually unnecessary in RealCalc.apk application. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Commands to Examine IMEI and IMSI 
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As presented in Figure 8, a source code containing “TelephonyManager” having function 
to gather IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity) and IMSI (Information Mobile Subscriber 
Identity) data from the Android infected by Uapush malware. 
 After reading IMEI and IMSI data, this malware collected these data. Both IMEI and IMSI 
are personal identity from every cellular device including an Android device. The information 
regarding IMEI and IMSI in an Android device was sent to a server having IP 117.135.141.99 with 
PORT 9000. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Script Used to Steal IMEI and IMSI Information from the Android Device  
 
In the case of RealCalc application, the android malware started to be active after installed 
and run in the android device. The Uapush malware then read and collect IMEI and IMSI 
information from the infected device undetected by the user. 
From those conducted analyses to the Java source code of RealCalc.apk application, this 
research summarized the malware processes infected RealCalc.apk application. This malware 
was active after RealCalc.apk was installed in the android device. Moreover, it ran malicious 
commands as well as new service in the device installed with RealCalc.apk. 
4. Conclusion 
The conducted implementation and testing results from the final paper entitled “Analysis of 
Uapush Malware Infection using Static and Behavior Method on Android” presents results as 
follows:  
1. Malware analysis using image RAM capture results obtained from LiME in an Android should 
be implemented by developing kernel according to the device version used in the research 
resulting accurate data to illustrate the whole system activity. 
2. Malware analysis using static method reveals more complete results to illustrate the workflow 
of an application before running. 
3. By using malware characteristics, the analysis process is important to examine the overall 
malware activity in the system. All malware characteristics were identified in this research from 
behavior analysis. 
4. The research shows the comparison discrepancy in the number of malware in the Android 
system between KitKat and Lollipop. The number of mutexes and malicious processes in 
KitKat is considered higher than those of the Lollipop presented by Graphic 1. This condition 
is caused by weaker security system in KitKat; hence, malwares can easily multiply the number 
of mutexes by camouflaging themselves in different processes.  
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